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Abstract
We provide a two-sided inequality for the α−optimal partition
value of a measurable space according to n nonatomic finite mea-
sures. The result extends and often improves Legut (1988) since the
bounds are obtained considering several partitions that maximize the
weighted sum of the partition values with varying weights, instead of
a single one.
1 Introduction
Let (C, C) be a measurable space, N = {1, 2, . . . , n}, n ∈ N and let {µi}i∈N
be nonatomic finite measures defined on the same σ−algebra C. Let P
stand for the set of all measurable partitions (A1, . . . , An) of C (Ai ∈ C for
all i ∈ N , ∪i∈NAi = C, Ai ∩ Aj = ∅ for all i 6= j). Let ∆n−1 denote the
(n − 1)-dimensional simplex. For this definition and the many others taken
from convex analysis, we refer to [10].
Definition 1. A partition (A∗1, . . . , A
∗
n) ∈ P is said to be α−optimal, for
α = (α1, . . . , αn) ∈ int∆n−1, if
vα := min
i∈N
{
µi(A
∗
i )
αi
}
= sup
{
min
i∈N
{
µi(Ai)
αi
}
: (A1, . . . , An) ∈P
}
. (1)
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This problem has a consolidated interpretation in economics. C is a
non-homogeneous, infinitely divisible good to be distributed among n agents
with idiosyncratic preferences, represented by the measures. A partition
(A1, . . . , An) ∈ P describes a possible division of the cake, with slice Ai
given to agent i ∈ N . A satisfactory compromise between the conflicting
interests of the agents, each having a relative claim αi, i ∈ N , over the
cake, is given by the α−optimal partition. It can be shown that the pro-
posed solution coincides with the Kalai-Smorodinski solution for bargaining
problems (See Kalai and Smorodinski [12] and Kalai [11]). When {µi}i∈N
are all probability measures, i.e.. µi(C) = 1 for all i ∈ N , the claim vector
α = (1/n, . . . , 1/n) describes a situation of perfect parity among agents. The
necessity to consider finite measures stems from game theoretic extensions
of the models, such as the one given in Dall’Aglio et al. [5].
When all the µi are probability measures, Dubins and Spanier [8] showed
that if µi 6= µj for some i, j ∈ N , then vα > 1. This bound was improved,
together with the definition of an upper bound by Elton et al. [9]. A further
improvement for the lower bound was given by Legut [13].
The aim of the present work is to provide further refinements for both
bounds. We consider the same geometrical setting employed by Legut [13],
i.e. the partition range, also known as Individual Pieces Set (IPS) (see Bar-
banel [2] for a thorough review of its properties), defined as
R := {(µ1(A1), . . . , µn(An)) : (A1, . . . , An) ∈P} ⊂ Rn+.
Let us consider some of its features. The set R is compact and convex (see
Lyapunov [17]). The supremum in (1) is therefore attained. Moreover
vα = max{r ∈ R+ : (α1r, α2r, . . . , αnr) ∩R 6= ∅}. (2)
So, the vector (vαα1, . . . , v
ααn) is the intersection between the Pareto frontier
of R and the ray rα = {(rα1, . . . , rαn) : r ≥ 0}.
To find both bounds, Legut locates the solution of the maxsum problem
sup
{∑
i∈N µi(Ai) : (A1, . . . , An) ∈P
}
on the partition range. Then, he finds
the convex hull of this point with the corner points ei = (0, . . . , µi(C), . . . , 0) ∈
Rn (µi(C) is placed on the i-th coordinate) to find a lower bound, and uses
a separating hyperplane argument to find the upper bound. We keep the
same framework, but consider the solutions of several maxsum problems with
weighted coordinates to find better approximations. Fix β = (β1, . . . , βn) ∈
∆n−1 and consider∑
i∈N
βiµi(A
β
i ) = sup
{∑
i∈N
βiµi(Ai) : (A1, . . . , An) ∈P
}
. (3)
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Let η be a non-negative finite-valued measure with respect to which each µi
is absolutely continuous (for instance we may consider η =
∑
i∈N µi). Then,
by the Radon-Nikodym theorem for each A ∈ C,
µi(A) =
∫
A
fidη ∀ i ∈ N,
where fi is the Radon-Nikodym derivative of µi with respect to η.
Finding a solution for (3) is rather straightforward:
Proposition 1. (see [8, Theorem 2], [1, Theorem 2] [4, Proposition 4.3])
Let β ∈ ∆n−1 and let Bβ = (Aβ1 , . . . , Aβn) be an n−partition of C. If
βkfk(x) ≥ βhfh(x) for all h, k ∈ N and for all x ∈ Aβk , (4)
then (Aβ1 , . . . , A
β
n) is optimal for (3).
Definition 2. Given β ∈ ∆n−1, an efficient value vector (EVV) with respect
to β, uβ = (uβ1 , . . . , u
β
n), is defined by
uβi = µi(A
β
i ), for each i = 1, . . . , n.
The EVV uβ is a point where the hyperplane∑
i∈N
βixi =
∑
i∈N
βiui (5)
touches the partition range R, so uβ lies on the Pareto border of R.
2 The main result
As we will see later only one EVV is enough to assure a lower bound, we give
a general result for the case where several EVVs have already been computed.
We derive this approximation result through a convex combination of these
easily computable points in R, which lie close to (α1vα, . . . , αnvα).
Theorem 1. Consider m ≤ n linearly independent vectors u1, . . . , um, where
ui = (ui1, ui2, . . . , uin), i ∈ M := {1, 2, . . . ,m}, is the EVV associated to βi,
βi = (βi1, . . . , βin) ∈ ∆n−1. Let U = (u1, u2, . . . , um) be an n×m matrix and
denote as U¯ an m×m submatrix of U such that
det(U¯) 6= 0 . (6)
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(i)
α ∈ cone(u1, . . . , um) (7)
if and only if
det(U¯) det(U¯αi) ≥ 0 for all i ∈M, (8)
where U¯αi is the m×m matrix obtained by replacing the i−th column of
U¯ with α¯ ∈ Rm, obtained from α by selecting the elements corresponding
to the rows in U¯ . Moreover,
α ∈ ri(cone(u1, . . . , um)) (9)
if and only if
det(U¯) det(U¯αi) > 0 for all i ∈M. (10)
(ii) For any choice of u1, . . . , um,
vα ≤ min
i∈M
∑
j∈N βijuij∑
j∈N βijαj
. (11)
Moreover, if (8) holds, then
1∑
i∈M
∑
j∈M α¯j
[
U¯−1
]
ij
≤ vα (12)
where
[
U¯−1
]
ij
is the ij-th element of U¯−1.
Proof. To prove (i), suppose (8) holds. We show that conv(u1, . . . , um)∩rα 6=
∅, and therefore that (7) holds, by verifying that the following system of linear
equations in the variables r, t1, t2, . . . , tm
t1u11 + t2u21 + . . .+ tmum1 = α1r
t1u12 + t2u22 + . . .+ tmum2 = α2r
...
t1u1n + t2u2n + . . .+ tmumn = αnr
t1 + t2 + . . .+ tm = 1
(13)
has a unique solution (r∗, t∗1, . . . , t
∗
m) with t
∗
i ≥ 0, for i ∈ M . First of all,
det(U¯) 6= 0 implies det(U¯αi∗) 6= 0 for at least an i∗ ∈ M , otherwise all the
EVVs would lie on the same hyperplane, contradicting the linear indepen-
dence of such vectors. This fact and (8) imply that the coefficient matrix has
4
rank m + 1 and its unique solution can be obtained by deleting the n −m
equations corresponding to the rows not in U¯ . Denote each column of U¯
as u¯i = (u¯i1, . . . , u¯im), i ∈ M and denote as α¯ = (α¯1, . . . , α¯m), the vector
obtained from α by selecting the same components as each u¯i. By Cramer’s
rule we have for each i ∈M ,
ti =
det

u¯11 u¯21 . . . u¯i−1,1 0 u¯i+1,1 . . . u¯m1 −α¯1
u¯11 u¯22 . . . u¯i−1,2 0 u¯i+1,2 . . . u¯m2 −α¯2
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
u¯1m u¯2m . . . u¯i−1,m 0 u¯i+1,m . . . u¯mm −α¯m
1 1 . . . 1 1 1 . . . 1 0

det

u¯11 . . . u¯m1 −α¯1
...
...
...
...
u¯1m . . . u¯mm −α¯m
1 . . . 1 0

=
(−1)i+(m+1) det

u¯11 u¯21 . . . u¯i−1,1 u¯i+1,1 . . . u¯m1 −α¯1
u¯12 u¯22 . . . u¯i−1,2 u¯i+1,2 . . . u¯m2 −α¯2
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
u¯1m u¯2m . . . u¯i−1,m u¯i+1,m . . . u¯mm −α¯m

∑
j∈M(−1)(m+1)+j det
 u¯11 . . . u¯j−1,1 u¯j+1,1 . . . u¯m1 −α¯1... ... ... ... ... ... ...
u¯1m . . . u¯j−1,m u¯j+1,m . . . u¯mm −α¯m

=
(−1)2m+2 det(U¯αi)∑
j∈M(−1)2m+2 det(U¯αj)
=
det(U¯αi)∑
j∈M det(U¯αj)
≥ 0
since by (8) either a determinant is null or it has the same sign of the other
determinants. If (10) holds, then ti > 0 for every i ∈M and (9) holds.
Conversely, each row of U not in U¯ is a linear combination of the rows in
U¯ . Therefore, each point of span(u1, . . . , um) is identified by a vector x ∈ Rm
whose components correspond to the rows in U¯ , while the other components
are obtained by means of the same linear combinations that yield the rows
of U outside U¯ .
Let U¯−j denote the m × (m − 1) matrix obtained from the matrix U¯
without u¯j, j ∈M . Consider a hyperplane H−j in span(u1, . . . , um) through
the origin and m− 1 EVVs
H−j := det(x, U¯−j) = 0,
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where j ∈ N . If α /∈ cone(u1, . . . , um), when we separate the subspace
through H−j, for all j ∈ N either the ray rα is coplanar to H−j, i.e.,
det(α¯, U¯−j) = 0, (14)
or α¯ and u¯j lie in the same half-space, i.e.,
det(α¯, U¯−j) det(u¯j, U¯−j) > 0. (15)
Moving the first column to the j-th position in all the matrices above, we
get (8). In case (9) holds, only the inequalities in (15) are feasible and (10)
holds.
To prove (ii), consider, for any i ∈ N , the hyperplane (5) that intersects
the ray rα at the point (r¯iα1, . . . , r¯iαn), with
r¯i =
∑
j∈N βijuij∑
j∈N βijαj
.
Since R is convex, the intersection point is not internal to R. So, r¯i ≥ vα
for i ∈M , and, therefore, mini∈M r¯i ≥ vα.
We get the lower bound for vα as solution in r of the system (13). By
Cramer’s rule,
r∗ =
det

u¯11 u¯21 . . . u¯m1 0
u¯12 u¯22 . . . u¯m2 0
...
...
...
...
...
u¯1m u¯2m . . . u¯mm 0
1 1 . . . 1 1

det

u¯11 u¯21 . . . u¯m1 −α¯1
u¯12 u¯22 . . . u¯m2 −α¯2
...
...
...
...
...
u¯1m u¯2m . . . u¯mm −α¯m
1 1 . . . 1 0

=
det(U¯)
det

0 1 1 . . . 1
−α¯1 u¯11 u¯21 . . . u¯m1
−α¯2 u¯12 u¯22 . . . u¯m2
...
...
...
...
...
−α¯m u¯1m u¯2m . . . u¯mm

=
det(U¯)∑
i∈M
∑
j∈M (−1)i+jα¯j det(U¯ij)
=
1∑
i∈M
∑
j∈M α¯j
[
U¯−1
]
ij
,
where det(U¯ij) is the ij-th minor of U¯ . The second equality derives by
suitable exchanges of rows and columns in the denominator matrix: In fact,
swapping the first rows and columns of the matrix leaves the determinant
unaltered. The last equality derives by dividing each row i of U¯ by αi, i ∈M .
Finally, by (2) we have r∗ ≤ vα.
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Remark 1. The above result shows that whenever det(U¯αi) = 0, then ti = 0.
Therefore, the corresponding EVV ui is irrelevant to the formulation of the
lower bound and can be discarded. We will therefore keep only those EVV
that satisfy (10) and will denote them as the supporting EVVs for the lower
bound.
In the case m = n we have
Corollary 1. Suppose that there are n vectors u1, . . . , un, where ui, i ∈ N ,
is the EVV associated to βi, βi = (βi1, . . . , βin) ∈ ∆n−1. If U = (u1, . . . , un),
det(U) 6= 0 and, for all i ∈ N
det(U) · det(Uαi) ≥ 0, (16)
where Uαi is the n× n matrix obtained by replacing ui with α in U , then
1∑
i∈N
∑
j∈N αj [U
−1]ij
≤ vα ≤ min
i∈N
∑
j∈N βijuij∑
j∈N βijαj
(17)
where [U−1]ij is the ij-th element of U
−1.
We next consider two further corollaries that provide bounds in case only
one EVV is available. The first one works with an EVV associated to an
arbitrary vector β ∈ ∆n−1.
Corollary 2. ([6, Proposition 3.4]) Let µ1, . . . , µn be finite measures and let
u = (u1, u2, . . . , un) be the EVV corresponding to β ∈ ∆n−1 such that
α−1j uj = max
i∈N
α−1i ui. (18)
Then,
uj
αj +
∑
i 6=j
[
µ−1i (C)(αiuj − αjui)
] ≤ vα ≤ ∑i∈N βiui∑
i∈N αiui
. (19)
Proof. Consider the corner points of the partition range
ei = (0, . . . , µi(C), . . . , 0) ∈ Rn ,
where µi(C) is placed on the i-th coordinate (i ∈ N), and the matrix U =
(e1, . . . , ej−1, u, ej+1, . . . , en), where u occupies the j-th position. Now
det(U) = uj
∏
i∈N\{j}
µi(C) > 0
det(Uαj) = αj
∏
i∈N\{j}
µi(C) > 0
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and, for all i ∈ N \ {j},
det(Uαi) = (αiuj − αjui)
∏
k∈N\{i,j}
µk(C) ,
which is positive by (18). Therefore, U satisfies the hypotheses of Corollary
1. Since U has inverse
U−1 =

1
µ1(C)
0 · · · − u1
µ1(C)uj
· · · 0
0 1
µ1(C)
· · · − u2
µ2(C)uj
· · · 0
...
...
. . .
...
. . .
...
0 0 · · · 1
uj
· · · 0
...
...
. . .
...
. . .
...
0 0 · · · − un
µn(C)uj
· · · 1
µn(C)

,
the following lower bound is guaranteed for vα:
vα ≥ r∗ = uj
αj +
∑
i∈N\{j}
[
µ−1i (C)(αiuj − αjui)
].
The upper bound is a direct consequence of Theorem 1.
In case all measures µi, i ∈ N, are normalized to one and the only EVV
considered is the one corresponding to β = (1/n, . . . , 1/n), we obtain Legut’s
result.
Corollary 3. ([13, Theorem 3]) Let µ1, . . . , µn be probability measures and
let u = (u1, u2, . . . , un) be the EVV corresponding to β = (1/n, . . . , 1/n). Let
j ∈ N be such that (18) holds. Then,
uj
uj − αj(K − 1) ≤ v
α ≤
∑
i∈N
ui, (20)
where K =
∑
i∈N ui.
Proof. Simply apply Corollary 2 with µi(C) = 1, for all i ∈ N and β =
(1/n, . . . , 1/n). Then
vα ≥ r∗ = uj
αj +
∑
i 6=j(αiuj − αjui)
=
uj
uj − αj(K − 1),
8
where K =
∑
i∈N ui. Finally, by Theorem 1 we have
vα ≤
∑
i∈N
(
1
n
ui
)
1
n
∑
i∈N αi
=
∑
i∈N
ui.
It is important to notice that the lower bound provided by Theorem
1 certainly improves on Legut’s lower bound only when one of the EVVs
forming the matrix U is the one associated to β = (1/n, . . . , 1/n).
Example 1. We consider a [0, 1] good that has to be divided among three
agents with equal claims, α = (1/3, 1/3, 1/3), and preferences given as density
functions of probability measures
f1(x) = 1 f2(x) = 2x f3(x) = 30x(1− x)4 x ∈ [0, 1] ,
f3 being the density function of a Beta(2, 5) distribution. The preferences
of the players are not concentrated (following Definition 12.9 in Barbanel
[2]) and therefore there is only one EVV associated to each β ∈ ∆2 (cfr. [2],
Theorem 12.12)
Figure 1: The density functions in Example 1. Agent 1: tiny dashing; Agent 2: large
dashing; Agent 3: continuous line.
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
x
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
f
The EVV corresponding to βeq = (1/3, 1/3, 1/3) is ueq = (0.0501, 0.75, 0.8594).
Consequently, the bounds provided by Legut are
1.3437 ≤ vα ≤ 1.6594.
Consider now two other EVVs
u1 = (0.2881, 0.5556, 0.7761) u2 = (0.25, 0.9375, 0)
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corresponding to β1 = (0.4, 0.3, 0.3) and β2 = (0.3, 0.6, 0.1), respectively.
The matrix U = (u1, u2, ueq) satisfies the hypotheses of Theorem 1 and the
improved bounds are
1.4656 ≤ vα ≤ 1.5443.
3 Improving the bounds
The bounds for vα depend on the choice of the EVVs that satisfy the hy-
potheses of Theorem 1. Any new EVV yields a new term in the upper bound.
Since we consider the minimum of these terms, this addition is never harmful.
Improving the lower bound is a more delicate task, since we should modify
the set of supporting EVVs for the lower bound, i.e. those EVVs that include
the ray rα in their convex hull. When we examine a new EVV we should
verify whether replacing an EVV in the old set will bring to an improvement.
A brute force method would require us to verify whether conditions (8)
are verified with the new EVV in place of α. Only in this case we have a
guarantee that the new EVV will not make the bound worst. Then, we
should verify (8) again, with the new EVV replacing one of the m EVVs, in
order to find the EVV from the old set to replace. However, in the following
proposition we propose a more efficient condition for improving the bounds,
by which we simultaneously verify that the new EVV belongs to the convex
hull of the m EVVs and detect the vector to replace.
For any couple j, k ∈M denote as U¯∗j−k the m× (m−1) matrix obtained
from U¯ by replacing column j with u∗ and by deleting column k.
Theorem 2. Let u∗, u1, u2, . . . , um be m + 1 EVVs with the last m vectors
satisfying conditions (6) and (10). If there exists j ∈M such that
det(α¯, U¯∗j−k) det(u¯j, U¯∗j−k) ≤ 0 for every k ∈M \ {j} (21)
then
u∗ ∈ cone(u1, . . . , um) (22)
α ∈ cone({ui}i 6=j, u∗) (23)
Moreover, if all the inequalities in (21) are strict then in both (22) and (23)
the vectors belong to the relative interior of the respective cones.
Proof. Before proving the individual statements, we sketch a geometric in-
terpretation for condition (21). As in Theorem 1 we restrict our analysis to
the subspace span(u1, . . . , um). For any k ∈M \ {j}, the hyperplanes
H∗j−k = {x ∈ Rm : det(x, U¯∗j−k) = 0}
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should separate uj and α (strictly if all the inequalities in (21) are strict) in
the subspace span(u1, . . . , um).
To prove (22), argue by contradiction and suppose u∗ /∈ cone(u1, . . . , um).
Then, for any j ∈M, there must exist a k 6= j such that the hyperplane H∗j−k
passes through all the EVV (including u∗) but uj and uk, and supports
cone(u1, . . . , um). Therefore, α and uj belong to the same strict halfspace
defined by H∗j−k, contradicting (21).
To show the existence of such hyperplane consider the hyperplane HM
in span(u1, . . . , um) passing through u1, . . . , um and denote with u∗M the in-
tersection of ru∗ with such hyperplane. Restricting our attention to the
points in HM , the vectors u
1, . . . , um form a simplicial polyhedron with
u∗M /∈ conv(u1, . . . , um). There must thus exist a k 6= j such that the (m−2)-
dimensional hyperplane HM−jk in HM , passing through u∗M and {ui}i/∈{j,k},
supports conv(u1, . . . , um) and contains uj (and α) in one of its strict halfs-
paces (see Appendix.) If we now consider the hyperplane in span(u1, . . . , um)
passing through the origin and HM−jk we obtain the required hyperplane
H∗j−k.
To prove (23) we need some preliminary results. First of all, under (21),
det(U¯∗j) 6= 0 (24)
Otherwise, u∗ would be coplanar to H−j and any hyperplane H∗j−k, k 6= j,
would coincide with it. In such case the separating conditions (21) would
not hold. Moreover, there must exist some other h 6= j for which
det(U¯∗h) 6= 0 (25)
otherwise, u∗ would coincide with uj, making the result trivial.
We also derive an equivalent condition for (21). Let U¯aj,bk be the m×m
matrix obtained from U¯ by replacing vectors uj and uk by some other vectors,
say ua and ub, respectively. If we move the first column to the k-th position,
(21) becomes
det(U¯∗j,αk) det(U¯∗j,jk) ≤ 0 for every k 6= j
Switching positions j and k in the second matrix we get det(U¯∗j,jk) = − det(U¯∗k)
and therefore
det(U¯∗j,αk) det(U¯∗k) ≥ 0 for every k 6= j . (26)
From (24), (25) and from part (i) of the present Theorem, we derive
det(U¯∗j) det(U¯∗h) > 0
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and therefore, (26) yields
det(U¯∗j,αk) det(U¯∗j) = det(U¯∗j,αk) det(U¯∗h) det(U¯∗j) det(U¯∗h)−1 ≥ 0
for any k 6= j (27)
Condition (27) and Theorem 1 allow us to conclude that α ∈ conv({uk}k 6=j, u∗).
Regarding the last statement of the Theorem, we have already shown
(24). Moreover, if (21) hold with a strict inequality sign for any k 6= j, then
det(U¯∗k) 6= 0 for the same k and u∗ ∈ ri(cone(u1, . . . , um)). Similarly, (27)
would hold with strict inequality signs and α ∈ ri(cone({uk}k 6=j, u∗)).
Remark 2. If (21) holds, we get not only that rα intersects the convex hull
of the m EVVs {ui}i∈M\{j} ∪ {u∗}, but also that the ray ru∗ intersects the
convex hull of the m EVVs u1, . . . , um. We can therefore replace uj with u∗
in the set of supporting EVVs for the lower bound. If the test fails for each
j ∈ M , we discard u∗ we keep the current lower bound (with its supporting
EVVs).
In case (21) holds with an equality sign for some k, conditions (24) and
(27) together imply det(U¯∗j,αk) = 0. Therefore, we could discard uk from the
set of supporting EVVs for the lower bound.
Example 1 (Continued). We consider a list of 1’000 random vectors in ∆2
and, starting from the identity matrix, we iteratively pick each vector in
the list. If this satisfies condition (21), then the matrix U is updated. The
update occurs 9 times and the resulting EVVs which generate the matrix U
are
u1 = (0.5144, 0.5663, 0.3447)
u2 = (0.4858, 0.5462, 0.4410)
u3 = (0.4816, 0.3910, 0.6551)
corresponding, respectively, to
β1 = (0.4273, 0.2597, 0.3130)
β2 = (0.4524, 0.3357, 0.2119)
β3 = (0.4543, 0.3450, 0.2007)
Correspondingly, the bounds shrink to
1.4792 ≤ vα ≤ 1.4898.
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The previous example shows that updating the matrix U of EVVs through
a random selection of the new candidates is rather inefficient, since it takes
more than 100 new random vectors, on average, to find a valid replacement
for vectors in U .
A more efficient way method picks the candidate EVVs through some
accurate choice of the corresponding values of β. In [6] a subgradient method
is considered to find the value of vα up to any specified level of precision. In
that algorithm, Legut’s lower bound is used, but this can be replaced by the
lower bound suggested by Theorem 1.
Example 1 (Continued). Considering the improved subgradient algorithm,
we obtain the following sharper bounds
1.48768 ≤ vα ≤ 1.48775
after 27 iterations of the algorithm in which, at each repetion, a new EVV is
considered.
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Appendix
The proof of (22) in Theorem 2 is based on the following Lemma. This
is probably known and too trivial to appear in a published version of the
present work. However, we could not find an explicit reference to cite it.
Therefore, we state and prove the result in this appendix
Lemma 1. Consider n affinely independent points u1, . . . , un in Rn−1 and
u∗ /∈ conv(u1, . . . , un). For each j ∈ N there must exist a k 6= j such that the
hyperplane passing through u∗ and {ui}i/∈{j,k} supports conv(u1, . . . , um) and
has uj in one of its strict halfspaces.
Proof. Suppose the thesis is not true. Then, for any h, ` ∈ N , the hyper-
plane passing through u∗ and {ui}i∈N\{h,`} will strictly separate the remaining
points uh and u`.
Fix now j ∈ N and consider H−j, the hyperplane passing through the
points {ui}i∈N\{j}. Also denote as uj∗ the intersection between H−j and
the line joining u∗ and uj. Clearly uj∗ /∈ conv({ui}i∈N\{j}). Therefore, for
any k ∈ N \ {j}, the hyperplane H−jk in H−j passing through {ui}i∈N\{j,k}
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will strictly separate uk and uj∗. Consequently, u
j
∗ should simultaneously lie
in the halfspace of H−jk not containing conv({ui}i∈N\{j}), and in the cone
formed by the other hyperplanes H−jh, h ∈ N \ {j, k} and not containing
conv({ui}i∈N\{j}). A contradiction.
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